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FIGHTING AT AND FROM THE SEA
A Second Opinion
Frank Uhlig, Jr.
In our concentration on the excellent sensors, weapons, computers, and com-munications systems now or soon to be in our hands, strategic and operational
naval theory has faded from our minds—in some cases, it may never even have
entered. Hence, the great effects imposed on the Navy and, indeed, on the world
at large by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan seemingly have passed forever. Since
Mahan, who died nearly ninety years ago, few have ventured into this still ill-
explored field of endeavor, and the names of those who have done so do not
easily come to the minds of others.
However, naval theory beyond the management of arms, sensors, and communi-
cations is alive, if not perfectly well.1 Those writing today in this field invite thought
on several matters, but here I will comment on only one—the methods for the use
of naval forces in war.
One well informed and thoughtful scholar lists six
such methods.2 These, in the order discussed below,
are coastal defense, maritime power projection, com-
merce raiding, the fleet-in-being, fleet battle, and
blockade. Over the centuries navies have used, or tried,
all of them, and others, too. In the last half-century they
have added two new methods. Perhaps a third is in
the offing.
The defense of coasts, and especially of harbors,
against superior forces coming from the sea has most
often and most powerfully been undertaken from
ashore by armies and air forces. The usual result of a
Frank Uhlig is a sponsored research scholar of the Naval
War College. For over twenty years he was an editor and
senior editor at the U.S. Naval Institute, where he
founded the annual Naval Review. In 1981 Frank
Uhlig became the editor of the Naval War College Press
(which produces this journal); he retired from that post
in September 1993.
For making this article better than it would have been
without their help, the author is indebted not only to
Captain Wayne Hughes and Commander Guy Thomas
(both cited in the notes) but also to Professor Milan Vego,
of the Naval War College’s faculty; to Captain Peter
Swartz, U.S. Navy (Retired), of the CNA Corporation in
Alexandria, Virginia; and to Mr. Robert J. Cressman, of
the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C.
© 2002 by Frank Uhlig, Jr.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 2
1
Uhlig: Fighting at and from the Sea—A Second Opinion
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
strong harbor defense is that the potential invader either chooses a less desirable
place through which to begin his campaign ashore, or he does not try at all.
Cases in point are Manila in World War II and, also in World War II, some of the
French Atlantic ports, all of them well defended. The Japanese, impressed by the
harbor defenses at Manila, began their drive upon that city in December 1941 at
Lingayen Gulf, 120 miles to the north. At the time of the Allied amphibious at-
tack at Normandy in 1944, British and American respect for the German de-
fenses of the French Atlantic ports led them to land near none of them. Through
the use of small craft, including submarines, and minefields, local naval forces
can contribute, in an adjunctive manner, to the defense of a coast or port, but
they have seldom had the principal role and seem unlikely to do so often in the
foreseeable future.
Maritime power projection consists of bombardments by aircraft, missiles,
and guns, small-unit raids ashore, and invasions, all coming from across the sea.
Whatever the form, this is what coastal defenses are supposed to thwart. These
offensive actions from the sea are an option for strong navies when the enemy’s
navy is weak and even more so when his coastal defenses, too, are thin. When the
defending enemy is strong the attacking fleet, and the landing force as well, must
be very strong.
Nowadays, it might be argued, a large amphibious force would surely be de-
tected well ahead of time, the defenders alerted, and the amphibious assault
crushed. Still, in most such assaults of the last century, even though the defender
usually did not know exactly when the attack was coming, he hardly ever was un-
prepared to oppose it vigorously. Yet, almost without exception, the amphibious as-
sault carried the day. Thus, one should not refrain from using the amphibious
weapon simply because it may no longer be hidden. In effect, it seldom ever was.
In 2001–2002, Osama bin Laden and his Taliban hosts probably imagined
that in the absence of an Afghan coastline to be assaulted, they were safe from
American reprisals mounted from the sea for bin Laden’s murderous attacks on
the United States of 11 September. No doubt to the consternation of bin Laden
and the others, American diplomacy opened the Pakistani gates between Af-
ghanistan and the Indian Ocean, as well as other gates well inland, and the
American reprisals on the Taliban and their admiring guest came anyway. First
the reprisals came from aircraft flying off carriers in the Arabian Sea and, not
long after, from Air Force aircraft too. Some of the latter flew from Diego Garcia
in the Indian Ocean, others from countries bordering on Afghanistan, and some
directly from the United States. All American aircraft en route to Afghanistan
needed the help of not only diplomacy but also, because of the long distances
they had to fly in order to reach their objectives, that of tanker aircraft. The car-
rier planes were, for instance, “heavily dependent on shore-based tanking, much
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of which was provided by the RAF.”3 Altogether the aircraft, assisted by several
dozen Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles fired from ships at sea, achieved a
great deal. In cooperation with a few hundred Special Forces troops and a num-
ber of Afghan tribal armies, within a short time they chased the Taliban and its
guests out of the lowlands and the cities into the mountains, where the survivors
still lurk. The outcome of the struggle in Afghanistan is unclear and may remain
so for some time. But the aviators flying from afloat and ashore were essential to
the improvements so far achieved.
In whatever form it comes, maritime power projection works best when at
least the immediate objectives are at, or near, the coast, or at most within the
normal combat radius of the fleet’s aircraft, including those of the landing force.
It need not involve any combat afloat, though if such combat is among the possi-
bilities, a navy had best be prepared to engage in it successfully. In 1917–18 this
country advanced an army of two million soldiers across three thousand miles
of the contested Atlantic to
friendly French ports. To protect
the forward-moving battalions,
regiments, brigades, and divisions
in their transports from German
U-boats, the Navy provided each
convoy with a substantial escort of destroyers. Once the troops were disem-
barked, authorities ashore took over and moved them to where they would be
needed, eventually to the fighting front three or four hundred miles inland.
Though not an invasion, that enormous achievement, right up to disembarka-
tion, certainly was “maritime power projection.”
On a much smaller scale but mounted much more swiftly and over a much
greater distance—eight thousand miles—the Royal Navy also projected power
ashore in 1982, in response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.
The British navy landed the rescuing troops not in a friendly port but across a
hostile, though undefended, beach fifty miles from the objective, which was the
garrisoned village of Port Stanley. The Argentines chose to oppose the British
amphibious assault—that is, they engaged in coastal defense—not with the
troops they had on the islands, nor with missile-armed surface combatants, but
with naval and air force aircraft flying from bases four hundred miles distant. It
was only by a slight margin that the Argentine aviators failed. But they did, and
in a few days the British landing force had recaptured the archipelago.
Whether the objective is near to, or far from, the beach, maritime power pro-
jection has so far had the most influence when the power projected from the
ships consisted chiefly of troops in sufficient numbers to meet the need, and
when the fleet supported them, during the landing and thereafter, with fire and
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logistics. A new form of fire support for forces ashore or about to go ashore is
that of defending them, and the ships in which they are embarked, against attack
by ballistic missiles. This may prove to be a heavy burden, to be borne by only a
small number of ships. In our recent small wars, the primary forces projected,
whether from ashore or afloat, have consisted of bomber and attack aircraft,
with troops and surface-to-surface missiles in a supporting role.4 Be that as it
may, a successfully landed army soon enough will provide its own fire, including
that against ballistic missiles, but while the fighting lasts, its need for logistical
support will be unending.
A few small, short-distance airborne assaults were carried out during World
War II, notably by the Germans at Crete in 1941. But as a rule, the projection of
an army across the water has been successful only when either there was little
danger to shipping at sea or the side that wished to project force ashore had
gained at least momentary command of those parts of the sea that were of inter-
est to it. It had to continue to maintain such command for as long as it wished to
sustain its forces on the other shore. After their air-landed assault forces had de-
feated the British defenders on Crete, the Germans achieved adequate local sea
command, chiefly through the use of shore-based aviation.
Sometimes the weaker side at sea will engage in commerce raiding—that is, at-
tacks on enemy shipping where no core issues are at stake, where distances are
great, and where, while enemy merchant ships may be scarce, enemy warships
are scarcer yet. The objective is, as inexpensively as possible, to annoy and incon-
venience the enemy as much as possible without attracting too much of the en-
emy’s strength to the defense of its distant merchantmen. This mode is
exemplified by the nineteenth-century Confederate raider Alabama and by Ger-
many’s newly armed former merchant ships roaming the lonely southern ocean in
the last century’s world wars. This might still work, but probably not for long.
It was the weaker side too, and it alone, that would engage in the practice of a
fleet-in-being. This required little more than a substantial naval presence with
which to inhibit useful activities on the part of the more powerful opponent.
The mere presence of the large German High Seas Fleet in the southeastern cor-
ner of the North Sea through the entire First World War is an example. It pre-
vented the British from shifting important elements of the more powerful
Grand Fleet (based at Scapa Flow, in that sea’s northwestern corner) to other wa-
ters where they would have been most welcome. As the example suggests, the ef-
fect of a fleet-in-being was likely to be marginal. After 1918 this passive and
largely ineffective form of warfare had just about died. Current means of intelli-
gence and communications have buried the corpse.5
Fleet battle is aimed, through the defeat and even destruction of the enemy’s
main force at sea, at gaining command of that sea. Why does one seek such
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command? What can one do with it? One seeks such command so that friendly
shipping, filled with cargoes or people necessary for the survival of a nation and
the success of its forces in battle, can sail to where it is needed when it is needed,
and so that hostile shipping cannot do those things.
Once the enemy’s main force at sea is defeated or destroyed, one’s own com-
batant ships can then be dispersed in ways that will help ensure the destruction
of the enemy’s weaker warships and the capture, blockade, or destruction of his
military and commercial shipping. Moreover, concentrated anew, they can pro-
tect and support forces engaged in the projection of power ashore.
What do we mean by “shipping”? Commercial shipping, normally privately
owned but in wartime usually under government control, consists of ships car-
rying fuel (gas, coal, oil, refined products), dry bulk cargoes (grains and ores),
food and manufactured goods (now almost always in containers), autos and
trucks, and heavy and bulky structures (sometimes including damaged ships).
Commercial shipping also includes ships and boats engaged in fishing, in
support of those extracting oil and gas from the sea, and in the swift or clandes-
tine transport of such illegal cargoes as drugs and unsought immigrants.
Though they are not ships, oil and gas rigs in the ocean, and transoceanic cables
too, are as worthy of naval attack and defense as any ship might be.
Military shipping, often commissioned naval vessels, includes all those ships that
do not take part in the struggle for command of the sea—such as those intended for
amphibious warfare and for the logistical support of forces engaged in combat
afloat, aloft, or ashore. Ballistic missile submarines come under this heading too.
Though there have been many actions between small and medium-sized na-
val forces—such as at Manila Bay (1898), Dogger Bank (1915), and the bloody
night actions in Ironbottom Sound (1942)—there have never been many fleet
battles. In the First World War there was only Jutland (1916). On that occasion
the German admirals had neither sought nor expected their encounter with the
Grand Fleet; thereafter they made
sure it would not be repeated. The
battle’s most important effect was
that the German navy shifted the
bulk of its effort to direct attack
on hostile shipping by means of
submarines. In the Second World War there were no fleet battles at all in either
the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and very few in the Pacific. It seems likely that
no one now, or soon to be, in any navy will ever experience such an action.
Blockades attempt in another way to achieve what successful fleet battles the-
oretically do. The military blockade is an attempt by the stronger fleet to keep
the weaker fleet locked in port where it can do its own side no good, its enemy no
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harm. Even in the old days blockades were more common than big battles, be-
cause while the stronger fleet longed for a fleet action, the weaker one dreaded
such a thing. Since the coming of the aircraft and now of the long-range missile
as well, ships in port are not likely to be any safer than those at sea. The difference
is that ships at sea can do things, and they often are hard for an enemy to find,
while those in port can do nothing and are easy for an enemy to find.
Just before the First World War, with the submarine an established part of ev-
ery fleet, the aircraft not far behind, and the effectiveness of minefields upon in-
cautious ships beyond doubt, the British decided that next time they would
establish a “distant” blockade (hundreds of miles from the ports of interest)
rather than a “close” one.
When war broke out in 1914, traffic across the once commercially lively
North Sea ended, as a result of the British blockade; that sea became, in the
words of a German admiral, Edward Wegener, a “dead sea.”6 So it remained as
long as the war lasted. Mainly in its commercial form, the distant blockade was a
great success. Almost no ships, civil or naval, tried to sail from outside into Ger-
man ports or from German ports to destinations outside. Only U-boats tried
that. They made such voyages routinely, but they alone.
In the role of counterblockaders the U-boats proved highly successful. In the
English Channel, the Western Approaches to Britain, and the Mediterranean
too, they could not capture British and other Allied shipping, but they could
sink it. Soon an old truth reasserted itself—that Britain and its allies, much more
than a wholly continental alliance, were dependent for their very lives on the
flow of merchant shipping in and out. The defeat of Allied shipping by the
U-boats would have meant the defeat of the entire Allied war effort. In the nick
of time, the British, both naval officers and merchant mariners, reluctantly rec-
ognized that the way to overcome the deadly threat was to form merchantmen into
convoys guarded by small warships suitable to the task. This they did; as a result, the
threat to shipping was cut to a bearable size. The Allies recovered their strength, and
before the end of 1918 they had defeated Germany on the western front.
In the second war, that of 1939–45, as soon as possible the struggle at sea be-
tween submarines and convoys took the form of submarine “wolf packs” de-
ployed operationally against convoys by headquarters ashore on the strength of
communications intelligence. The convoys, this time protected not only by
small warships but also by large, land-based aircraft, came to depend as well on
advice, commands, and communications intelligence from their own headquar-
ters ashore. In keeping with the Allied objective at sea—the safe and timely ar-
rival of the convoys—the most important use of such intelligence was to route
the convoys away from where it was expected that U-boats would be. The next
most important use of it was to direct Allied aircraft and warships not needed
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for escort of convoys to where U-boats would most likely be found. It took the
Allies three and a half years to win this struggle. Once they had the upper hand
they never loosened their grip, for victory in the Atlantic was the prerequisite for
victory on and over the continent of Europe.
What we have seen here—sustained heavy assault on, and defense of, ship-
ping far at sea—is something not often found in lists of naval functions. How-
ever, since the world wars we have not seen, nor are we likely soon to see again,
anything like it. Rather, the assault on, and defense of, shipping has abandoned
the open oceans and moved into coastal waters and the narrow seas. Aircraft and
surface combatants large and small have engaged in such warfare during the last
half-century in the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Per-
sian Gulf, Red Sea, eastern Mediterranean, and Falkland Sound. Some of their
actions have had much greater influence, or impact, on the course of the war
than the small size of the craft often engaged would lead one to expect.
By the middle of the twentieth century we had seen the end, so it appears, of
commerce raiding, the fleet battle, and the fleet-in-being. What remained for
navies was, by whatever means were both possible technically and acceptable
politically, to ensure that friendly shipping could reach its destination in a safe
and timely fashion and that hostile shipping could not. Should friendly shipping
be able to do as desired, then and only then would it also be possible, if necessary,
to engage in maritime projection of power—that is, to assault the enemy ashore,
in whatever ways seemed most suitable.
Since then, two methods of using naval forces have been added and two strate-
gic conditions have changed. The first new method to be added was the deterrence
of nuclear attack—the forestalling of any such attack upon one country by means
of the threat of an equal or greater nuclear blow upon the country that had
launched the attack. The necessity for this arose shortly after the Soviet Union
demonstrated its ability to manufacture and use nuclear weapons. In the United
States, at first nuclear deterrence was entirely the responsibility of the Air Force,
but over time it shifted toward the sea, and now, through its ballistic-missile sub-
marines, the Navy has a large, perhaps the largest, part to play. For the same reason
as the United States, the Soviets, British, and French also supplied themselves with
such submarines. With Russia having reasserted its own existence in place of the
sinister Soviet Union and the good relations now enjoyed among all four powers
possessing such submarines, the deterrence task has lost the salience it once had.
Moreover, it has no part in our current struggle against a stateless enemy, Osama
bin Laden and his criminal gang of religious zealots. But against a small power po-
tentially possessing some “weapons of mass destruction,” the deterrent effect of
our ready nuclear forces should be as dependable at least as it was in the days of an
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immensely powerful, aggressive, and overtly hostile Soviet Union. As the years go
by it will be important to replace old ships, weapons, and all else necessary to the
success of the force dedicated to the role of nuclear deterrence.
The other new method of employing naval forces is that of making sure
friendly air traffic can pass over the sea and hostile military air traffic cannot. Let
us quickly review an example. In the fall of 1973 the United States responded to
an Israeli demand for help during the war that had broken out between that
country and Egypt (to the southwest) and Syria (to the northeast). U.S. combat
aircraft were flown from this country to Israel; to ensure their safe and timely ar-
rival, the Sixth Fleet strung itself out almost from one end of the Mediterranean
to the other. Its immediate tasks were navigational assistance to transiting air-
craft, protection against air interdiction originating in North Africa, and help in
the event of a mishap. Two carriers of the three available in that theater provided
tanker support to aircraft that needed it, while the third made room for some of
those same aircraft on its flight deck. Shortly, it appeared that the other great
power actively engaged in the area, the Soviet Union, might be preparing to air-
lift some of its own troops to Egypt. In response, the Sixth Fleet concentrated
south of Crete, where, should the situation arise, it could both protect Israeli-
bound shipping and aircraft, and destroy Soviet shipping and aircraft bound for
Egypt. Meanwhile Soviet warships, which had been stationed where they could
protect supply ships and air transports bound for Syria, moved south so they
could provide similar protection to air transports bound for Egypt. They might
have performed that task either by means of surface-to-air missiles with which
to engage U.S. fighter planes headed toward the transport aircraft, or by means
of surface-to-surface missiles with which to engage the carriers from which the
aircraft would fly. By that time, however, a truce respected by both sides had
taken hold ashore. The Soviets did not try to fly their troops to Egypt. Slowly the
ships dispersed, and the crisis wound down.7
At the top of the preceding paragraph is an inequality: a fleet must ensure the
passage of “friendly air traffic”and prevent the passage of “hostile military air traf-
fic.” The reason for protecting all friendly air traffic is plain. But attack on hostile
civil aircraft, at least at the beginning of a war, could result in the destruction of an
airplane filled with hundreds of civilian passengers trying merely to go about their
private lives. In 1988 a U.S. warship did shoot down an Iranian civil airliner (hav-
ing mistaken it for an attacking combat plane), and nearly three hundred people
perished unnecessarily. Nothing much came of this, for the United States ex-
pressed its regrets immediately and did what little it could to make amends. A
more ominous analog was the sinking by a U-boat in 1915 of the British passenger
liner Lusitania, an attack that cost over a thousand lives, including those of many
Americans. Most people in this country had been indifferent to the outcome of
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the European war, but the sinking turned many of them into opponents of Ger-
many and helped bring about the American decision two years later to enter the
war against that country. So, although passage of hostile military aircraft over the
sea, or even inland within reach of the fleet’s weapons, should be prevented, pas-
sage of an enemy’s civil aircraft is a different matter.
The potential third new method of employing naval forces in war or near-war
is that of forward defense of countries friendly to us from attack by ballistic mis-
siles. If this task, which is likely to be separate from that of defending our own
forces, were undertaken by the U.S. Navy, it would require the services of per-
haps a large portion of the nation’s not very numerous modern surface combat-
ants, at some measurable cost to the accomplishment of other assigned, or
assumed, missions.
In order to destroy a hostile ballistic missile before it has gained too much
speed or advanced too far into space for a forward-deployed ship to counter, our
ship might have to be very close to the launching site. However, its being there
would mark it as a clear and present danger to one of the potential enemy’s most
highly prized possessions. Thus, before launching a missile (not necessarily only
one missile), the enemy might reasonably seek to disable, sink, or capture our
forward-located ballistic missile–defense ship. Because the hair-trigger nature of
our ship’s duty will demand the
full attention of all on board, to
assure that it can carry out its
assigned task, we might find it
advisable to deploy additional
forces for its protection. This is
one of those old naval issues that, when ignored, bring great difficulty. Consider
the catastrophes that enveloped those lonely far-forward ships, the USS Liberty
in 1967 and the USS Pueblo in 1968.8
Perhaps the threat to a hostile ruler of being annihilated himself, along with
all he values, posed by our, and other countries’ nuclear deterrent forces, so suc-
cessful for so long, will still prove to be the least provocative, most effective de-
fense we will have against hostile missiles.9
The ability and willingness to counter-attack is inherent in deterrence. So it
will be necessary for the government to make clear to everyone that no matter
what its nature or means of delivery, any “weapon of mass destruction” fired at
this country, at our forces, or at one of our allies who does not itself possess nu-
clear deterrent forces, will yield in return more than one nuclear explosion in the
land of the perpetrator.
The first of the two strategic conditions that changed in the second half of the
last century is that most of the countries that had maintained large navies and
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used them vigorously in the wars of the first half of that century have lost inter-
est in engaging in wars against their neighbors and thus also lost the resources
needed to do so, let alone to engage in warfare against countries at a significant
distance. Thus, except for the United States, they now see no further need to have
large navies. Moreover, though powerful militarily ashore, neither China nor In-
dia seems ready to match its strength there with similar strength afloat. For its
part, with 337 ships in commission at the end of 2001, the U.S. Navy, currently
the biggest in the world by far, has about the same number of ships in commis-
sion as it did during the years of pacifism and economic depression between the
two world wars. This number is far smaller than at any time since those days.10 It
is a number not soon likely to grow.
The second changed strategic condition is that few major countries—China
is the great exception—nowadays man or maintain substantial merchant fleets
under their own flags. Indeed, in Europe and North America, once the world’s
main sources and users of seagoing ships of all kinds, not many people even
know how to build a merchant ship. What has not changed is that almost all
those countries are as dependent as ever on the safe and timely flow of merchant
ships into their ports, each ship filled with necessary or at least desirable im-
ports. In general, they are equally dependent on the safe and timely flow of such
ships out of their ports, many of them filled with important exports. Few people
today know that oceangoing merchant ships are not only much larger than their
predecessors but also more numerous than they have been for a long time.11 The
coming into common use of the highly efficient cargo container, which can
swiftly be moved from ship to truck or train, has led to the economical commer-
cial practice of “just in time” resupply of goods or products from source to store.
No one wishes disruption of this efficient flow—that is, no one except those at
war with important exporters or importers.
During their long war of 1980–88, Iran and Iraq came to attack each other’s
oil exports. Iraq did so by means of missiles launched from aircraft at what
mainly were neutral tankers attempting to fill themselves at Iranian terminals.
Iran did so primarily by laying mines in the channel between Kuwait (which was
Iraq’s seaport proxy) and the exit from the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi pilots hit many ships with their missiles. But despite the almost com-
plete absence of naval or air protection, the flow of neutral tankers willing to risk
attack never ended—the Iraqi attack on shipping failed. In contrast, the United
States, which favored Iraq as the lesser of evils and feared what the Iranian mines
and other naval instruments might do to Iraq’s ability to continue the war, ar-
ranged to have a number of foreign-flag tankers placed under American colors.
This justified the employment of U.S. warships to protect the tankers from any
form of Iranian attack. A series of skirmishes followed that led, among other
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results, to the destruction of several Iranian warships and oil drilling platforms at
sea, as well as serious mine damage to an American frigate. The most important
effect of these activities, albeit one little noticed, was that all merchant ships under
the protection of the U.S. fleet arrived where they were needed when they were
needed. After a year Iran called a halt to the war, not only that against the United
States but also that against Iraq.12
It is to the advantage of most countries that neither tankers nor container ships
be sunk at sea and that tankers, at least, not be sunk in port either. If a tanker were to
be sunk at sea, someone’s fishing grounds could be ruined, or a coast fouled, for
years—if in port, the result would be even worse. Should a container ship be fatally
damaged at sea, not only would the ship’s entire cargo be lost but hundreds, or even
thousands, of buoyant or semi-
buoyant containers could break
loose from the sinking ship and
form a giant floating minefield,
albeit a nonexplosive one, endan-
gering all ships and craft nearby, perhaps for months. A new task for navies, or for
the U.S. Coast Guard if the problem is in American waters, will be to round up all
those floating containers in such a contingency, either placing them aboard some
self-submerging ship—such as a dock landing ship (LSD) or a heavy-lift ship—or
sinking them so they will be no more a source of danger to others. This task will be
tedious, dangerous, and important. Hence, it is a good thing that the U.S. and other
navies have revived the old practice from sailing ship days of organizing boarding
parties in order to examine, and perhaps seize, merchant ships of interest—as well
as, for intelligence purposes, the people on board. Thus, in this old way
twenty-first-century navies can conduct blockades (or embargoes, quarantines, or
other terms suitable to non-war confrontations) in a highly effective fashion.13
However, that does not mean belligerents opposed to the safe passage of the
enemy’s ships, or enemy-supporting neutral ships, across the seas and oceans
will not resort to whatever means they have to sink them. If the ships in question
are ours or supporting us, the U.S. fleet must protect them. If they are the enemy’s
or supporting the enemy, that same fleet must blockade, capture, or sink them.
For an important reason, it will not be enough for navies just to be able to
board, examine, and perhaps seize merchant ships of interest. They must retain
the ability to sink them, for without that, the people in those ships might choose to
brush off the attentions of would-be boarding parties. When one considers in par-
ticular the current need to keep dangerous ships out of our ports and those of our
neighbors, the importance of retaining the capability to sink them looms large.
For that reason the U.S. fleets should consider establishing on each coast, or
other areas of concern, “flying squadrons” of suitable forces able to concentrate
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on ships of interest as far at sea as intelligence will permit. If such a ship resists
seizure, it should be sunk, and sunk as quickly as possible. No resource of ours
is better suited to that task than a submarine, for no other ships, and few air-
craft, have weapons so effective for that purpose as a submarine’s full-sized
torpedo—or two, or three, as needed. Other resources will be needed to rescue
survivors from the sea and, should any such survivors still be filled with murder-
ous hate, to control them until they are delivered to the authorities ashore.
How does this play out in a world dominated by information?
Commanders in the time of George Washington and Horatio Nelson had to fight
their battles, campaigns, and wars in an era of information poverty. Commanders
now must fight in an era of information wealth, or even of information excess.
We celebrate today the enormous volume, variety, and accuracy of informa-
tion we gather and the speed with which we move it over great distances. We
seek, send, receive, store, and delete information. Sometimes between receiving
information and deleting it we examine and act upon it well. Information now
not only comes from, but also goes to, great numbers of devices that we have
conceived, created, and deployed. One example is the direct coupling of sensors
and navigators to weapons.14 Hitherto, forces were accustomed to firing, launch-
ing, or dropping many weapons in the hope of gaining at most a few hits. With
the current coupling, the likelihood of a hit is so high that only one weapon, or a
few, need be directed at any target. The influence of this change on the require-
ments for ships, aircraft, launchers, weapons, fuel, parts, and crews has been
enormous. Now only a few (or a little) of each of these can achieve as much as
once required many (and much). This both eases a navy’s problem of protecting
logistical ships and aircraft and magnifies the effect of the loss of even one. In time
the enemy, whoever it may be, will be operating under the same influences.
All the foregoing—people, ships, weapons, and the rest—must be harnessed
by the commander in order to carry out his (or her, not yet its) intent. Nowadays
that commander is more likely than ever before to be at a great distance from the
scene of action; yet he possesses the ability to make tactical decisions in a timely
fashion. This ability is something far beyond the reach of Admiral Chester
Nimitz in Hawaii during World War II, or even in the thick of battle, as Vice Ad-
miral Nelson was at Trafalgar in 1805. Current and future very senior officers
and civilian officials having such power likely will see it as a good thing. Among
the others, at least some will see it otherwise.
Whether information comes from near or far, or reaches the recipient
through his eyes or ears, the great efforts we make now (and made in the past,
too) to gain and transmit it are all intended to influence, affect, and direct in a
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timely way their recipients’ thoughts and actions. The same purposes lie behind
efforts to deny the enemy timely access to accurate information and, in the same
fashion, to provide him instead with believable misinformation.15
Hence, both sender and receiver must be able to trust that the signal received is
identical to the signal sent. They must also be able to understand accurately what
has come in and, if a message is just wrong, or fraudulent, to sense that. (Recent ex-
periences in Eastern Europe and Central Asia suggest we have room for improve-
ment here.) Finally, those to whom information is sent must be able to decide
swiftly what to do about it—sometimes to do nothing is best—and send out to their
subordinates orders that are coherent, practical, and suitable to the occasion.
It is in this context that naval forces now and in the foreseeable future must
carry out their missions. How will they do that?
Mainly, it appears, they will make sure that friendly ships, and aircraft flying
over the sea, can go where they are needed when they are needed, and that enemy
ships and military aircraft flying over the sea cannot do those things. Further-
more, if necessary or desirable, they will land forces ashore, supporting them
then, and thereafter, with fire and logistics. (If sufficient ground forces are al-
ready in place, the provision by the fleet of fire and logistics will be enough.) For
those who like labels, this can be called “objective-centered warfare.”
Little of the foregoing is new. Less is dramatic. Often those engaged in a navy’s
work must demonstrate high skill and courage. As they do so, they must under-
stand that the world will most likely have focused its attention elsewhere and
will never notice how well they perform. But those are everlasting characteristics
of war at sea, and from the sea.
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